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Addendum
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone,
or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by
anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers,
publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making,
completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference,
publication or utterance purports to be the act of another, whether the
person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a
time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case,
or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed.
76-6-404. Theft —Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Element of the offense"
defined.
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent
until each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be

acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the
offense but shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT

Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution Article 1, Section 12; Utah Code
Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Defendant raises three issues:
1)

Does the offense of theft merge into one offense of forgery or vice
versa?

2)

Did the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she knowingly
and intentionally uttered a forged document when she merely
passed the check from a passenger in her car to the cashier?

3)

Should the Court have granted the defendant's motion for mistrial
after the State introduced improper character evidence as follows:
a. Officer's suspected defendant had associated with the passenger
in a separate forgery where the passenger was suspected;
b. She had been arrested on a separate unrelated offense.
c. Advising the jury that the defendant's husband was on supervised
probation; and
d. Suggesting that she was reportedly fired from a job for stealing;

STATEMENT OF CASE
The defendant was convicted of both Forgery and Theft. During trial the
defendant sought a mistrial due to the State's attempted to introduce improper

character evidence Post-trial, the defendant motioned to arrest judgment. Defendant
argued the State had 1) failed to prove that she had knowledge that the document
was forged and 2) the theft and the forgery charge should have merged into one
offense. Defendant also sought a merger of the two offenses into one.

RELEVANT FACTUAL STATEMENT
The defendant was convicted of (1) 'forgery' in that she knowingly uttered a
forged document with the purpose to defraud, and (2) 'theft' that by uttering the
forged check she deprived the store of property with intent to permanently deprive. It
reportedly occurred on January 4,2004.
The jury trial consisted of only five (5) witnesses: The signatory to the
checking account, a cashier who received the check, Ms Gullata, and two police
officers who were called in rebuttal to question the character of Ms Gullata
The authorized signatory to the checking account testified that he did not
give Ms Gullata any permission to sign his name. This was not disputed. Trial
transcript Page 38-42.
The final direct evidence witness was Misty Pierce who testified she was
the assistant manager at a drive-in hamburger shop (Sonics) in Spanish Fork, Utah.
Page 43 Line 19. She knew the Ms Gullatta (Page 43 Line 24) through a mutual

friend. (Page 44 Line 6). They had visited prior to January, 2004 at a mutual friend's
house, and Pierce had bought a game system from Ms Gullatta. Page 44 Line 7-10.
Their children had played with the other's children. Page 52 Line 16. This was
confirmed by Gullatta's testimony. Page 55.
Ms Piece's reported the defendant, her son, and a female passenger
(Alvey) pulled into the drive-thru and started to order meals. The defendant was
driving and a female (Alvey) was in the front passenger seat. Page 46. When the
defendant pulled up to the payment window, Ms Pierce and the defendant
exchanged conversation (chit chat) for a couple of minutes. Page 46 Line 17/ Page
48 Line 11. Page 51 Line 11. There was no attempt to hide Gullata's identity. Page
51 Line 7. The defendant simply handed a check for the payment of the food. Page
46 Line 20. She could not identify who wrote out the check. Page 47 Line 8. She
could not deny that Alvey had written out the check and Ms Gullata had only handed
the check through the window. Page 52. The State rested.
Ms Gullata testified her passenger, Ms Alvey, was baby-sitting her children
that night and Alvey wanted to something to eat. Page 55.
At Sonics, Ms Alvey wrote a check out, handed it to Gullatta and she
handed it through the window to the cashier. Page 56. They had pulled up to the

drive thru where Ms Alvey ordered the food. Page 56 Line 16-20. Pierce testified
that the voice ordering did not sound like Ms Gullatta. Page 45 Line 13. According to
Ms Gullata, when she pulled up to the pay window, she asked to have the manager
(Ms Pierce) come to the window. Page 57 Line 2-6. This was confirmed by Pierce.
Ms Gullatta did not look at the check but merely passed it through. Page 57 Line 14.
She did not write the check nor assisted. Page 57 Line 22/ Page 58 Line 23-4. The
food was for Ms Alvey and Ms Gullatta's children. Page 58 Line 9.
The State on cross-examination then tried to impeach Ms Gullatta. Page
67 Line 18. The State questioned whether she had been with Ms Alvey when a
check was passed at another business eleven days later (January 15 at Urban Snow
and Skate). Page 67 Line 18. The State suggested that Gullatta was with Alvey
when Ms Alvey was suspected of passing other checks. Page 68. The State
suggested that they went to Urban Snow and purchased $350.00 worth of clothes
with a forged check. Page 69. This was denied. The State also suggested that she
had been fired from her job for stealing. Page 70 Line 8. This was denied.
The State never produced any direct evidence to contradict Ms Gullatta's
denial. Page 69.

In rebuttal, State then called police officer Richard Hales. Page 71. He
stated that he had arrested Gullatta for an unrelated offense. During defendant's
cross-examination of Hales, he noted he had made a handwriting comparison of
Gullata's signature and the writing on the check did not match Gullata's. He then
volunteered that he had already had a handwriting sample from her previously
(suggesting prior forgeries). Page 73.
The State then called officer Giles, Orem Police Department. He spoke of
checks passed at Urban Snow on January 15,2004. Giles reported that Melanie
Alvey was a suspect. Page 75 Line 1-8. The State then attempted to infer Ms
Gullatta was with Alvey via the police report suggesting that two females had went
to Urban Snow. Page 75 Line 19-22. Defendant objected again and the Court
sustained the objection.
The State then continued in their pursuit of improper evidence. In response
to the State's questioning, Giles stated that he got a hold of Ms Gullatta through her
husband's probation officer. Page 78 Page 12. Defendant objected again.
The defendant argued that the State is doing nothing but attempting to
introduce improper character evidence to infer her knowledge of the check's forgery.

Defendant asked the Court to declare a mistrial. Page 77 Line 1. The motion was
based on the following efforts by the State:
1. Checks passed by two females at Urban Snow where Alvey
had been a suspect. No tie to Ms Gullata.
2. Gullatta had an arrest warrant issued for her arrest unrelated to
the current case.
3. Giles located Gullatta via her husband's probation officer.
4. The State reported that she had been fired for stealing.
The Court denied the motion. However, the Court admonished the
prosecution and the officer. Giles belatedly apologized.
The Defense then requested the State proffer the evidence they sought
from Giles. Based on the proffer, the Court denied the any further attempt to
introduce evidence of other wrongs. Page 82 Line 11.
Defendant merely passed a check from the passenger in her car to a cashier at a
hamburger shop. Based on this act, the jury convicted the defendant of both forgery and theft.
Defendant argued that she did not know the check to be forged. In fact, she argued the
evidence suggested the opposite, in that, she sought out the manager (Ms Pierce).
BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT

1. The offense of forgery and theft merge when based on the same conduct.

Here,

the defendant's passing of the check from the passenger to the cashier and was
convicted of both forgery and theft. A single act cannot be punished twice.
2. The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the
check to be forged. She merely passed the check from the passenger to the
cashier. The act of uttering a forged check can be an innocent act which, standing
alone, should not automatically give rise to an inference of guilty knowledge. Here,
she drew attention to herself by calling over the store manager who she had a
acquaintanceship and familiarity. The State's only proof of knowledge was through
the use of invalid 404(b) evidence identified below.
3. The State suggested that the defendant had knowledge by asserting without proof:
a. The defendant had been arrested on unrelated charges.
b. The defendant had been fired from her job for stealing.
c. The defendant's husband was on probation.
d. The defendant's passenger had passed other checks eleven days later at
another location. The State failed to produce any direct evidence of such
assertion.

Defendant suggests the trial court should have declared a mistrial upon the
motion of the defendant.

DETAILED ARGUMENT
1.MERGER
Merger is a judicially-crafted doctrine available to protect the citizenry from
being twice punished for a single act. State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, 55 P.3d 1131.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) also provides that "[a] defendant may be convicted of
an offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the
offense charged and the included offense."
This Court in State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283 (Utah Ct. Appeals 1998) overturned a
kidnapping charge because the host crime (rape) necessarily included some detention. See
the Utah Supreme Court review in State v. Finlayson 994 P.2d 1243. See also State v. Couch,
635 P.2d 89 (1981 Utah Supreme) where the Court found kidnapping merged into the rape
charge.
Other examples are State v. Hernandez, 2003 Ut App 276,76 P.3d 198, where this
Court found that DUI and Reckless Driving, although not having the same statutory elements,
may be a lesser included offense of the other. Aggravated assault may be a lesser-included

offense to murder (State v. Velarde. 734 P.2d 449 (Utah 1986) or aggravated burglary (State v.
Bradley. 752 P.2d 874 (Utah 1988). Aggravated robbery may be lesser-included offense to
murder. State v. Shaffer. 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986); Possession of a stolen vehicle may be a
lesser-included offense of vehicle theft. State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). Theft
maybe merged into robbery, State v. Hill. 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983).
Referencing forgery, Utah Courts have also found that forgery may be a
lesser-included offense to communication fraud or identify fraud. In State v. Ross.
951 P.2d 236, 241 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), this Court stated that if two crimes are such
that the greater cannot be committed without necessarily having committed the
lesser, then the lesser offense merges into the greater crime. The State cannot
convict and punish the defendant for both offenses.
Here, the conduct is the indistinguishable. The crime of forgery and theft
rely on the exact same facts—passing of the check from the passenger to the
cashier.
In State v. Chukes. 2003 Ut. App. 155,71 P.3d 624, the State conceded
that forgery maybe a lesser-included offense to identity fraud since the same
evidence supported both the identify fraud and the forgery
Because the Court concluded that forgery is a lesser included offense of

identity fraud, they did not reach Defendant's other contention that forgery is a
lesser included offense of theft by deception.
However, here the issue is squarely drawn. Based on a single act, the
defendant was twice convicted. The offense of theft and forgery is indistinguishable
here. Gullata took the check from her passenger and hand it to the cashier. For this
conduct, she has been punished twice. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3).
2. INSUFFICIENY OF PROOF
Defendant argues that the State has failed to meet their burden of proof
referencing knowledge. U.C.A. 76-1-501 provides:

(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent
until each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be
acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.

The defendant handed a check, forged by another, to a cashier. The State's
evidence suggested that the defendant's handwriting did not match the forger's. No
credible evidence existed to indicate the defendant's knowledge that the check was

forged and in the absence of proof, the defendant should be acquitted. U.C.A. 76-1501(1). She lacked the mental state required to convict of 'forgery' or 'theft'.
KNOWLEDGE
To prove "purpose to defraud," the State must show that an individual acted
with the knowledge that she is facilitating a fraud. State v Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App
289,988 P.2d 949. "Fraud" has been defined by the Utah Supreme Court as an
intentional misrepresentation offered for the purpose of inducing reliance upon it to
gain advantage. State v. Kitchen, 564 P.2d 760,763 (Utah 1977). See also State v.
Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct.App. 1991).
Defendant notes State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 Utah App. 289,988 P.2d 949,
where this Court found the possession or the act of passing a check from the
passenger to the cashier cannot shift the burden of proof to the defendant.
We do not think it proper to infer knowledge that an instrument is
forged from its mere possession or uttering. The act of
possessing a forged instrument and attempting to utter it can be
an innocent act which, standing alone, should not automatically
give rise to an inference of guilty knowledge
If the prosecution can
present no other facts or circumstances to create such additional
suspicion as would warrant the inference, there is insufficient
evidence from which the jury can reasonably infer knowledge or
intent

However, the Court noted the precedent of State v.Williams. 712 P.2d 220,
223 (Utah 1985) which seemingly and arguably shifted (unconstitutionally) the
burden of proof to the defendant.

Notwithstanding the views and concerns expressed above, we are
constrained to affirm the ruling of the trial court in the face of
binding precedent. Under current Utah law, a person who merely
utters a forged instrument can be inferred to have had knowledge
of the forgery. See State v. Williams. 712P.2d220. 223 (Utah
1985).

Recently as 2001, the Utah Supreme Court declined to review State v.
Williams. See State v. Clark. 2001 Ut 9,20 P.3d 300. However, their holding in Clark
suggests that one may infer knowledge under a probable cause standard but not
under the reasonable doubt standard. This interpretation would be supportive of the
position of this Court taken in State v. Gonzales. 2000 Ut App 136,2 P.3d 954
requiring all reasonable inferences to favor innocence as opposed to guilt.
Williams must also be read to avoid an unconstitutional shifting of the
burden of proof.

In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), the Court held a

jury instruction that presumed a person to intend the ordinary consequences of his

voluntary acts violated due process. Nothing should relieve the State of its burden
of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Mullanev v. Wilbur. 421 U.S. 684,698-701 (1975) the Court held that the
defendant cannot be held to any burden of proof. See also U.C.A. 76-1-501 which
requires the State to prove not only just the elements of the offense, the culpable
mental state but also the attendant circumstances. See also State v. Walton, 646
P.2d 689 (Utah 1982) for a similar holding.
Williams is easily distinguishable here. The William's Court held the
evidence was sufficient that the jury could have inferred knowledge. Here, the
defendant proffered evidence suggesting that she did not have the requisite
knowledge. She did not forge the signature (via handwriting analysis) and did not
know the check to be forged. She further presented evidence that she drew
attention to herself by acknowledge the manager, who as an acquaintance and
friend.
It is analogous to the Court's conclusion in State v. Andreason, 2001 Ut.
App 395,38 P.3d 982. There the Court found the State presented no evidence at
trial to show that Andreason intentionally or knowingly committed a forgery. It was

not supported by a quantum of evidence concerning knowledge. (In footnote 5, the
Court addressed the concerns of Kihlstrom and Williams.)
Here, the only evidence offered by the State was improper character
evidence. They offered no evidence to controvert her position except suggesting 1)
she had been fired for stealing; 2) had been arrested for unrelated charges; 3) her
husband was on probation; 4) Hales already had her handwriting sample (inferring
other forgery charges); and 5) she was suspected of being with Alvey eleven days
later where Alvey was suspected of passing a forged check.

MISTRIAL/CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Rule of Evidence, Rule 404(b) prohibits the introduction of evidence of
crimes, acts, or wrongs to impugn that person's character. State v. Decorso, 1999
UT 57,993 P.2d 837. If, however, proper noncharacter evidence is sought, its
admissibility is contingent upon satisfying the requirements of rules 402 (relevancy)
and 403 (prejudice) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See State v. Houskeeper, 2002
UT 118, 2862 P.3d 444.
The Rule provides:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a

person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive,..., intent, knowledge,.. .or absence of mistake or accident,...

MERE ASSERTION OF WRONGDOING
Here, the State's evidence was based merely on a belief/suspicion by Orem
officer Giles that Alvey was suspected in a separate forgery and Gullata was
present. In State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992), the Court found in a sex
abuse trial, it was improper to introduce evidence of a prior forgery conviction. A prior
theft conviction is inadmissible. State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989). Here, the
evidence did not rise to the level of a conviction but merely a suspicion.
An officer's suspicion/belief is not valid evidence. Rules of Evidence, Rule
608(b). The mere asking and thereby the suggestion of other wrongs is improper.
State v. Atkin, 2003 UT App 359,80 P.3d 157. The damage caused by the mere
question was detailed in State v. Goodliffe, 578 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1978).

Bare, unproven allegations or "complaints" of prior incidents
of similar conduct have no relevancy to the issue of defendant's
truthfulness or veracity. The admission of such evidence without
further explanation could only have caused the jury to speculate
about defendant's propensities to commit such crimes and confuse
the issues, all to the prejudice of defendant, which necessitates
a new trial. (Emphasis Added)

The State suggested that Gullata was with Alvey on a succeeding day
based only on the belief of Giles. It should be indisputable that the remaining
assertions have no relevancy: 1) Defendant's husband is on probation; 2) She had
been arrested for an unrelated charge; and 3) Defendant was fired from a job for
stealing. State v. Bruce. 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989).
The State wanted the jury to infer knowledge as noted in Goodliffe because
she was a thief; married to felon; arrested on unrelated charges; and the officer's
suspected her of other forgeries.
The defendant's character is not at issue. State v. Sisneros, 581 P.2d 1339
(Utah 1978). Here, the State suggested she was of sufficiently bad character that
they could infer she knew. See State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978).
PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT
Evidence of other crimes is presumed to be prejudicial absent a legitimate
reason for admission. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985); State v.
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989). As noted in State v. Emmett, in close cases
this evidence may be sufficient to tilt the verdict in favor of the State. In this case, the
only evidence the State had to offer was improper character suggestions, not
evidence.

CONCLUSIONS
The defendant was convicted of both the forgery and the theft. The act of
passing the check to the cashier is being twice punished. The passing of a check
should not constitute both the offense of theft and forgery. Consequently, one
offense should merge into the other.
The provisions of U.C.A. provided that the defendant has no burden of
proof. The State alone is charged with the responsibility of proving each element of
the offense, the conduct, attendant circumstances, results of the conduct prohibited
and the requisite mental state. U.C.A. 76-6-501 requires proof that the defendant
had the purpose to defraud or with knowledge that she was facilitating a fraud. In
the absence of such proof, the defendant should be acquitted.
The only evidence to suggest knowledge was improper character evidence.
The State obtained convictions based on evidence that she was a thief, married to a
felon, was suspected in other forgeries, and may have been with another when they
passed a forged check.
The trial court refused to grant defendant's mistrial after the accumulation of
all such evidence noted above. The failure to do so denied the defendant a fair trial

and allowed the jury to speculate about the defendant's character and any proclivity
she may have to commit this offense.
Defendant's convictions should be set aside. At the very least, one
conviction should be merged into the other.
DATED this 28th day of February, 2006.

SHELDEN R CARTER
Attorney for the defendant
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